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William F. Stewart. The Embattled General: Sir Richard Turner and 
the First World War. Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2015. Pp. 374.
This book is long overdue, not because its author took too long to 
write it but because Canada’s generals have been neglected in the 
growing historiography of the First World War, with the obvious 
exception of Arthur Currie. Certainly they are discussed in the 
standard works such as Tim Cook’s two volumes on the army and 
other books, but why, a century later, are there no biographical 
studies of Watson, Lipsett, Loomis, Macdonell and the rest?
Happily, we now have a serious examination of Richard Turner, the 
second most important (but technically highest ranking) Canadian 
general in the war. Like the others, Turner has long been neglected 
but more than the others, he merited a biography because he was 
controversial. The outline of his story is well-known: as a wealthy 
businessman active in the prewar militia, he rose rapidly through the 
ranks because of his political connections, was given command of a 
brigade in 1914, then a division, and proves in both positions to be 
not up to the task, so he was shunted off to an administrative post in 
England where he could do no more harm.
But is this a fair summary in fact? William Stewart does 
not think so and he offers another view in this well-written and 
forcefully argued book, which originated as a doctoral dissertation 
at the University of Birmingham. Taking an innovative—at least in 
Canada—approach, he bases his assessment of Turner on the criteria 
used in the us army’s leadership manual, modified to account for the 
different expectations and context of the First World War. Stewart 
also claims that he has based the book on the correspondence files of 
Major General John Carson, Sam Hughes’ “Special Representative” 
in England, the personnel correspondence of the Overseas Ministry 
of Military Forces, and the extensive volumes on administration in 
England that “have been hitherto virtually untouched” (p. 5). He also 
claims to be the first historian to use Sir Edward Kemp’s files “in 
almost their entirety” (p. 7).
Perhaps not surprisingly, Stewart concludes that Turner rates 
well by the criteria of the us army’s leadership manual, although he 
does concede errors of judgment from time to time and acknowledges 
Turner’s tendency to irascibility on occasion. He examines Turner’s 
two major failures—at Second Ypres and St Eloi—in great detail 
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and demonstrates that both were very difficult complex situations, at 
the time and in retrospect. With regard to Second Ypres, he seems 
unnecessarily defensive. The simple reality was that both Turner 
and his troops were inexperienced in April 1915 and they found 
themselves in an appalling situation that was unprecedented even 
to experienced officers and men. Turner unquestionably made errors 
but he was receiving terse handwritten directives from his divisional 
general Edwin Alderson delivered by runner in the midst of a crisis, 
so it is arguable that he was not entirely at fault if he misunderstood 
them.
It is useful to recall that Currie, in the same situation, actually 
left his headquarters and went back to 27th Divisional headquarters 
to try to persuade General Thomas Snow that the situation was 
worse than he realised. Snow was appalled, and wanted him sacked 
for leaving the battle. Snow, it should be noted, had come close to 
being sacked in September 1914 for his performance in the early 
part of the war. If Currie had been removed from his command, 
the history of the Canadian Corps would probably have been much 
different from what it was. The point is that the revered Currie, like 
Turner, did not perform too well in his baptism of fire either. Nor did 
other officers such as the 15th Battalion’s Lieutenant Colonel J.A. 
Currie, who completely collapsed. These men, for all their militia 
experience, had no real idea of what modern war was like. Some 
could not handle it, some could, and some were shaky at first but 
improved with experience.
Currie obviously improved with experience. Did Turner? His 
failure at St Eloi has consistently been cited to show that he did not, 
even though those who were there—and historians in retrospect—
agree that St Eloi was an unmitigated disaster from start to finish 
in which Turner again had to use inexperienced troops to relieve 
exhausted British troops, fighting in water and mud that was waist-
deep and worse. It was true that Turner and his staff misread 
photographs of the craters but so did British intelligence, and we all 
know that senior officers trying to command from behind the lines 
were almost always essentially out of touch in this war.
Stewart offers a spirited defence of Turner’s performance in light 
of the extraordinary situation he faced at St Eloi but also argues that 
Turner was on a learning curve, noting that his division achieved the 
only success of the Somme offensive and the first Allied victory of 
the war when it captured Courcelette in September 1916. A couple of 
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months later he was appointed goc of Canadian troops in England, 
ending his career as a field officer.
By the autumn of 1916 Borden recognized that the administration 
and training of the troops in England was being so badly mismanaged 
and that relations with British military authorities were so difficult, 
that action had to be taken. Displaying untypical creativity, he 
established the Ministry of Overseas Forces and appointed the 
solid and trusted Sir George Perley as minister. He then sacked 
Major General John Carson, Hughes’ representative in London and 
appointed Turner to head the Canadian army in England and to 
advise Perley. This appointment has consistently been viewed as a 
demotion (although actually he was promoted) and Turner certainly 
would have preferred to remain in the field. That it was not a demotion 
is indicated by the fact that Byng first recommended Currie, his 
protégé, for the post. The appointment of Turner, while it removed 
a commanding officer about whom Byng had reservations, was a 
brilliant move because Perley needed an experienced combat general 
with strong administrative ability to advise him and take charge of 
the army in England. Borden completed the reorganization of the 
army’s management by finally sacking Sam Hughes and replacing 
him with the competent Sir Edward Kemp.
Turner was a great success in England. Historians acknowledge 
that the Canadian Corps became an effective fighting force in 
1917 and 1918. Describing the Canadian Corps in April as “a 
disorganized rabble,” Denis Winter has argued that, by mid-1917, it 
had become “much the most effective unit in the bef.”1 The credit 
for this transformation is usually given to Currie but he only became 
commanding officer of the Corps in June 1917. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to accept Stewart’s assertion that Currie’s successes in 1917 
and 1918 were to some extent dependent on Turner’s reorganization 
and reform of Canadian military administration in England. 
Turner’s record in England was impressive. He cleaned up 
“Hughes’ bureaucratic labyrinth with sure handed professionalism,” 
(p. 27) standardized and updated the infantry’s training syllabus, 
sent home or to France a host of surplus officers, cleared out the 
log jam of reinforcements at the depot battalions, and mediated 
the medical corps’ continual bickering. He worked well with Perley 
as his military advisor and, despite their rivalry until Currie was 
1 Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (London, 1991), 131.
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appointed commanding officer of the Canadian Corps in the spring 
of 1917 and Currie’s belief that Turner was undercutting him at army 
headquarters, Turner supported Currie on every major issue, most 
significantly on the issue of reducing the size of divisions in the spring 
of 1918 and the controversial break-up of the 5th Division.
Stewart has made a valuable contribution to our understanding 
not only of Richard Turner’s career but also to the importance of 
the management of the army in England, and Turner’s contribution 
to improving it, to the effectiveness of the Canadian Corps in the 
field. This takes nothing away from Currie’s contribution but places 
it in context. Stewart makes the case that Turner’s experience in the 
war “was unique … in that it included senior command in both the 
combat arms and administration” (p. 3). It is further true that most 
publications on Canada’s role in the war “have focused on the active 
front to the neglect of the essential role of training and administration 
in England, as well as support units in France and Belgium” (p. 5).
Historians will continue to debate whether he was incompetent 
as a field commander or just unlucky because he has been judged on 
the basis of two very difficult battles that took place early in the war, 
but somehow receives scant credit for the success at Courcelette. But 
a senior general with field experience was needed for the exceedingly 
important task in London and the choice of credible candidates 
was pretty much limited to Currie or Turner. Currie, as Stewart 
concedes, was a better field commander than Turner and had the full 
confidence of Haig, while Turner did not. The result was that a wise 
appointment appeared, at least to those who think wars are won only 
on the battlefield, to be a dismissal.
The tragedy is not that Turner was pulled from the field and 
given an administrative position in England, but that historians have 
too casually dismissed him as a failure and not appreciated that 
modern warfare depends on organization, training, and the making 
sure that those in the field have what they need. We are indebted 
to William Stewart for pointing this out in this well written and 
provocative book.
brian douglass tennyson, cape breton university
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